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T HE NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF JEAN
BARBEYRAC: TRANSLATION AS AN ART
OF POLITICAL ADJUSTMENT
David Saunders
TRANSLATING AND ADJUSTING
Because words have histories, translating is not an ahistorical enterprise.
Whether transferring a writing of yesterday across time for readers of today, or
translocating a writing across space from its place and language of origin to a
different place and language of reception, translation involves adjustment. When
it confronts religious conflicts and political disputes, adjustment via translation
can be a strategic art, a weapon for serious struggle. Such was the case with Jean
Barbeyrac (1674–1744).
Diasporic Huguenots, Barbeyrac’s family escaped from Catholic France
to Calvinist Lausanne and Geneva. From Switzerland, the young Barbeyrac then
followed the pathway to Berlin taken by so many other French Protestant escap-
ees from Louis XIV’s persecution of their confessional minority. In Berlin from
1693 to 1710, and later in Lausanne and Groningen, Barbeyrac was to become
the preeminent eighteenth-century translator into French of Latin natural-law
works of the 1600s. What principally made his reputation were his ever more
profusely glossed translations of the German natural jurist, Samuel Pufendorf
(1632–94), notably the De jure naturae et gentium of 1672 (On the Law of Na-
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ture and Nations) and Pufendorf’s own 1673 abridgment of the De jure, the De
officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem (On the Duty of Man and Citizen
According to Natural Law), a digest for students of his new natural jurisprudence.1
As liberal Protestants, author and translator shared common moral
ground, but it will be their differences as political-juristic thinkers that the present
article addresses.2 The German jurist wrote to legitimate the political arrange-
ments of an absolutist state under the rule of law in the aftermath of the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) that ended the Thirty Years War. Pufendorf’s post-Westpha-
lian system was radical in its definitive separating of natural law from moral
theology as distinct disciplines, his object being to protect the public peace by
establishing the legitimacy of a civil sovereign who quarantined political govern-
ment from clerical intervention.3 Barbeyrac’s response was mixed. While endors-
ing Pufendorf’s stance against the confessional state, he could not accept the con-
sequences of the full secularization of civil authority that Pufendorf proposed,
nor the absolute character of sovereign power resulting from this. In reconfigur-
ing Pufendorf’s natural jurisprudence, Barbeyrac thus envisaged a quite different
end: to rejoin civil duties to religious morality and delimit state authority in the
face of individual conscience.
The following discussion draws in part on a recent reedition of the first
English translation of the De officio, by Andrew Tooke.4 Appearing in 1691, The
Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature was reissued in 1698 and
1705, before undergoing major revision in 1716 at the hands of anonymous edi-
tors.5 It was in this fourth edition that the English editors added footnotes and
included revised translations of key passages borrowed from the first edition of
Barbeyrac’s increasingly famous French version, Les devoirs de l’homme et du
citoien, published in Amsterdam in 1707.6 The 1716 English edition thus embod-
ies two significant political adjustments: Tooke’s original adaptation of Pufen-
dorf’s “statist” natural jurisprudence to fit an English “parliamentary” context;
and the editors’ subsequent adaptation of Barbeyrac’s reconfiguring of Pufendorf
for Francophone Huguenot readerships in Berlin, the United Provinces and be-
yond, vernacular publics whose political and moral formation was the very issue
at the heart of Pufendorf’s “revisionist” guide to natural law.
The 2003 reedition of The Whole Duty is augmented with the first En-
glish translation of three further components that Barbeyrac included in his fourth
edition of Les devoirs, published in 1718.7 First and best known of these was his
translation into French of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s excoriation of Pufendorf
in a Latin letter composed in 1701; the letter had been printed in 1709 as the
Epistola Viri Excellentissimi ad Amicum, quâ monita quaedam ad principia Pufen-
dorfiani operis, De Officio hominis et civis, continentur.8 Barbeyrac entitled the
German philosopher’s monita or “warning” on Pufendorf’s principles: “Jugement
d’un anonyme sur l’original de cet abrégé.”9 Taking the opportunity to defend
Pufendorf from Leibniz’s attack, Barbeyrac translated the letter into French, di-
viding it into twenty paragraphs between each of which he interposed his own
responses. While it has been available in English translation from Latin, Leibniz’s
text is now translated from Barbeyrac’s French version, with the latter’s interjec-
tions, thus restoring the format of its early eighteenth-century print circulation.10
The second and third additions are a Discours sur la permission des loix, deliv-
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ered by Barbeyrac as Rector of the Académie de Lausanne in 1715, and a Dis-
cours sur le bénéfice des loix, delivered in the same office in 1716. The 1716
edition of The Whole Duty of Man could not of course have incorporated these
components of Barbeyrac’s 1718 edition. But now, three centuries later, Anglo-
phone readers can access an important avenue into political disputes and reli-
gious conflicts still tearing early eighteenth-century Protestantism.
 Three thresholds of adjustment mark these French and English versions
of the De officio:11 Barbeyrac’s 1707 French translation bridging the reception
context of Pufendorf’s Latin original and the Huguenot translator’s vernacular
readership; Tooke’s 1691 rendering of the De officio into English for a non-Lati-
nate readership and, in the 1716 edition, the editors’ further adjustment of the
English text in light of Barbeyrac’s 1707 translation and notes; and Barbeyrac’s
1718 translation of and response to Leibniz’s divine-rational critique of Pufen-
dorf’s politically grounded natural jurisprudence.
Historically speaking, natural law was a preeminent presence in early
modern intellectual life. It lay at the epicenter of profound disputes over the right
boundaries to be drawn between church and state, and especially over any move
to grant the political state a secular legitimacy. Given the diverse religious-politi-
cal trajectories of different Western European territories and the violently con-
tested concept of state sovereignty, early modern natural law was not a unified
phenomenon of culture. Its doctrines could not help but be adjusted and readjust-
ed in accordance with conflicts fought and settlements achieved in this or that
theatre of religious dissension and political struggle. These adjustments and read-
justments are manifest in vernacular translations of Latin natural-law writings
that played a significant part in cosmopolitan interactions in the early 1700s.12
BARBEYRAC’S ROLE IN THE ENGLISH RECEPTION OF
PUFENDORF’S DE OFFICIO
Between the first publication of Tooke’s English translation of the De
officio in 1691 and the appearance in 1716 of the fourth edition of The Whole
Duty of Man with its borrowings from Barbeyrac, Louis XIV died. This death in
1715 no doubt gave pause, whether to those who still hoped for or to those who
had long feared a universal Catholicization of Europe led by the imperial French
king. English politics in the 1690s remained in uncertain balance between Will-
iam III’s insistence on the fiscal and military prerogatives necessary to wage a
defensive Protestant war against the French and Parliament’s claim to the status
of an independent sovereign legislature.13 Into this context Tooke’s translation
imported Pufendorf’s absolutist natural jurisprudence, originally deployed to le-
gitimate Protestant territorial states engaged in a struggle for hegemony against
Catholic Empire and local estates. To English readers for whom absolutism—and
its associated raison d’état thinking—was an alien political form, the German
jurist’s “Bodinian” lexicon of civitas (“state”) and summum imperium (“sover-
eignty”) could scarcely enter English usage without adjustment.
For Tooke the lexical strategy was circumlocution. The De officio’s twen-
tieth-century English translator, Michael Silverthorne, recognizes that Tooke’s
reluctance to employ “state” for civitas in the Pufendorfian sense of an indepen-
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dent sovereign dominion manifested itself in a variety of alternative terms, in-
cluding “society,” “civil society,” “commonwealth,” “community,” and “nation.”14
In the English political lexicon at the turn of the eighteenth century, however, as
Silverthorne observes, “[w]hat we do not have authority for is ‘state.’”15 For Bar-
beyrac, conversely, “Etat” appears to have posed no problem, being routinely
employed for civitas:
Lors que cette union de Volontéz & de forces est entièrement faite, elle
produit le Corps Politique, que l’on appelle un Etat, & qui est la plus
puissante de toutes les Sociétez.16
By comparison with Barbeyrac’s 1707 rendering, Tooke’s corresponding English
text of 1691 reads:
And when there is an Union made of their Wills and Forces, then this
Multitude of Men may be said to be animated and incorporated into a
Firm and Lasting Society.17
Silverthorne’s version underscores the difference: “Only when they have achieved
a union of wills and forces is a multitude of men brought to life as a corporate
body stronger than any other body, namely a state [civitas].”18 Tooke, it seems,
adapted Pufendorf to express a distinctively English sensibility to the then current
political weight of “state.” Yet at least one of his preferences coincided with Bar-
beyrac’s alternative rendering of civitas as “société civile” which—as “civil soci-
ety”—could pass more easily into English circulation than “state.”19
Unlike the anonymous editors of the 1716 edition of The Whole Duty of
Man, as translator of the De officio Tooke had no access to Barbeyrac’s 1707
French version. This was not the case of his English contemporary, Basil Kennet,
the translator of the De jure. As we shall see, for his 1717 edition of The Law of
Nature and Nations Kennet could draw on Barbeyrac’s 1706 French translation,
Le droit de la nature et des gens, and its footnote commentary.20 Kennet’s lexical
choices are mostly similar to Tooke’s, however, as evidenced in the chapter “Of
the Causes and Motives inducing Men to establish civil Societies,” where Kennet
confronts a veritable compendium of key political terms:
For the clearing up of this whole Matter, we ought to consider, what
that Condition is which Men enter into, upon their erecting a civil State;
what Qualities they are which may entitle them to the Name of political
Creatures; and lastly, what there is in their Frame and Constitution
which seems (if we may so speak) to indispose them for a Civil Life.
First then, whoever enters into a Community, divests himself of his
natural Freedom, and puts himself under Government, which, amongst
other Things, comprehends the Power of Life and Death over him,
together with Authority to enjoin him some Things to which he has an
utter Aversion, and to prohibit others, for which he may have as strong
an Inclination.21
Here Kennet’s “civil State” renders Pufendorf’s unadorned civitas. Next, Kennet
deletes the phrase “that is, good citizen” (i. e. bonus civis) with which Pufendorf
qualifies “political creatures” (animal politicum), the jurist’s statist gloss designed
to undercut the metaphysical naturalism of Aristotle’s concept of zoon politikon.
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For Pufendorf, the good citizen is an adventitious creation of civil discipline, not
the inevitable realization of a moral nature. In Kennet’s second sentence, the En-
glish text tells of entering a “Community” and accepting its “Government.” By
contrast, in Pufendorf it is entrance to the state that is at issue, a political event
that entails subjection to command or sovereignty (Civitatem qui subit . . . impe-
rio se subjicit).
More easily than the English versions, Barbeyrac’s French translation of
the De officio allows the state supremacy as the most powerful of all social bod-
ies. In fact, he offers an explicit justification for his usage of “Etat” at the opening
of the fifth chapter of Book II, “Des motifs qui ont porté les Hommes à former
des Sociétés Civiles.” The topic is how men, in exiting from the “petites Sociétéz”
or small associations of the state of nature, “then formed political bodies, or civil
societies, to which we give the name of State.”22 Barbeyrac’s footnote glosses
“Etat” in the following terms:
Civitas, says our Author [Pufendorf], and this is good Latin: but our
French word Cité, which is cognate, is no longer used in this sense. The
word Etat clearly derives from [the Latin] Status, because the Société
Civile is the Etat Public of those who constitute it; and this is why the
Roman jurisconsults define their Public Law, Jus, quod ad STATUM rei
Romanae spectat.23
There is no suggestion here that the translation of civitas by “Etat” was a neolo-
gism in need of justification or an eccentricity in need of excuse.24
Yet, for Barbeyrac, a crucial normative issue remains: the relation of the
state’s exercise of political supremacy to the prerogatives of the individual con-
science. For Pufendorf, the domain of conscience should not extend into govern-
ment of the civil sphere. This follows from his more Hobbesian view of con-
science as always a judgment in accordance with a law (which may be the law of
God). What is unacceptable—because it had proven so inimical to peaceful coex-
istence among the rival confessions—is an exercise of civil judgment on the basis
of an inner insight. This can only spread tumult, given the now irreducible con-
flict of confessional beliefs. In respect to this crucial issue, however, Barbeyrac
was not unlike Tooke in moderating the “statist” dimensions of Pufendorf’s writ-
ings, but with a Huguenot’s view to regrounding natural law explicitly in an invi-
olable right of conscience.25 If Barbeyrac insisted on the moral wrong—and prac-
tical futility—of using the secular sword to force the individual conscience, this
was to defend man’s access via conscience to the irresistible moral laws written in
the heart by God. Footnote commentary underscored this Lockean stance.
Principled commitment to freedom of conscience might seem necessarily
to comport religious toleration. Yet the confessional wars of massacre, fought not
for land but for purity of faith and cleansing away of heretics, had shown over
and again that a defense of conscience was not simply synonymous with a rejec-
tion of violence. Viewed in this light, Pufendorfian statism was arguably a more
“tolerant” politics for the task of managing the now permanent fact of religious
pluralism, not least to the extent that such a politics envisaged a civil sovereign
exempted from judging issues of theological truth (or error).26
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PUFENDORF, LEIBNIZ, BARBEYRAC
Between Leibniz and Pufendorf no love was lost. As Leibniz famously
wrote to Kästner in 1709, he considered the jurist parum jurisconsultus et minime
philosophus, “an inadequate lawyer and a worse philosopher.” His monita or
“warning” against Pufendorf’s principles of natural law was no less famous.27
Reviewing the metaphysical philosopher’s confrontation with Pufendorf’s new
political jurisprudence, Norberto Bobbio identifies their confrontation with the
conceptual clash of rationalism and voluntarism.28 But the discord between the
“philosopher-jurist” (Leibniz) and the “jurist-philosopher” (Pufendorf) was far
more consequential than a purely intellectual exchange. It was, writes Bobbio,
the confrontation of a “theological” and a “secular and worldly” conception of
law, marking a decisive cleavage between old and new.29 At this historical divide
between theology and jurisprudence, the two fundamental ways of addressing
legal philosophy found their two great representatives in Leibniz and Pufendorf.
The political jurist stipulated a limit to natural law at the very threshold where
the metaphysical philosopher claimed insight into the transcendent moral reason
that alone could guide—and judge—the civil laws.30 The political stakes were
very high. Did civil laws continue in a state of debility until informed by the
universal moral norms of natural law secundum disciplinam Christianorum, “ac-
cording to the teaching of the Christians”? Were clerical powers and Christian
morality always to superintend state sovereignty and political authority?
In publishing Leibniz’s anti-Pufendorf warning in 1718, Barbeyrac in no
way offers a thoroughgoing “defense” of the political jurist. In fact he jeopardizes
Pufendorf’s intellectual strategy of legitimating an absolutist state that would not
subordinate civil authority to confessional ends. True, Barbeyrac also takes his
distance from Leibniz, where the latter reasserts the traditional nexus of natural
law and metaphysics and thus reserves a role for theologico-rational superinten-
dence over individual consciences. As a Huguenot facing Louis XIV’s state pro-
gram of Catholic reconformity, Barbeyrac can contemplate what Leibniz could
not: the separation of religion and church from law and state. Conversely, Pufen-
dorf’s detheologized natural law might ground a secularized civil authority but it
did not secure the moral value most prized in the Huguenot perspective: an invi-
olable right of conscience.31 By reimplanting the primacy of conscience, Barbey-
rac reimplants natural law in moral theology.
But in such a complex matter there is more to say. Leibniz, as noted, set
transcendent moral reason above Pufendorf’s worldly natural law, and universal
justice above the civil justice of a human tribunal whose end was mere security.
Here Barbeyrac surely paused. What if an “unreasonable” moral reason were
endorsed and enforced by a civil authority—in the name of religious conformity
and political unity—such that dissenters were constrained, on pain of sanction, to
go against their conscientious belief? The dilemma confronting Barbeyrac would
have given point to the exclusion of inner states—mental, moral or spiritual—
from the jurisdiction of natural law that Pufendorf envisages in the De officio:
[A]s human jurisdiction is concerned only with a man’s external actions
and does not penetrate to what is hidden in the heart and which gives
no external effect or sign, and consequently takes no account of it, natural
law too is largely concerned with forming men’s external actions.32
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Confinement of natural law to the forming of “external actions” appals Leibniz.
He counters Pufendorf’s withdrawal of natural law from the inner life with the
expansive claim that “in a universal society governed by God every virtue, as has
already been said many times, is comprehended among the obligations of univer-
sal justice; and not only external acts, but also all of our sentiments are regulated
by a certain rule of law.”33 Correctly, Leibniz recognizes that Pufendorf’s demar-
cation between external actions and “what is hidden in the heart” signifies the
emergence of a juridical regime over which moral theologians—and metaphysical
philosophers—would have no say. This prospect provokes the charge that the
author of the De officio would remove “Christian philosophers,” those essential
masters of the inner life, from the domain of natural law. Absent the “Christian
philosophers,” Leibniz threatens, natural law would be disconnected from the
“eternal truths” of “universal jurisprudence” with whose transcendent standard
all law, human and divine, must comply if it is to be legitimate. The applicable
maxim is “that not everything should be measured by the goods of this life.”34
Leibniz can only refuse Pufendorf’s further argument that—regardless of their
inner state of moral good or spiritual grace—men can meet the demands of a civil
ethics provided they conduct themselves in a manner that conforms externally to
the rules of worldly sociability. Leibniz, by contrast, believed that heretical belief
could be punished as a crime.35 Inner states were perfectly justiciable.
Between Leibniz and Pufendorf, Barbeyrac is ambivalent. He endorses
Leibniz’s extending of natural law to embrace matters of the inner life. Individual
conscience is thus the true adjudicator of external acts because, alone, it offers
unmediated access to the will of God. Implausibly, Barbeyrac would have us be-
lieve that Pufendorf too maintains the binding force of conscience as the nexus
between external acts and inner states, the link between law and eternity.36 But
Barbeyrac knew what had happened in France, when an all-powerful civil author-
ity acted to enforce its version of eternity.37 Against Leibniz, he could therefore
endorse Pufendorf’s conception of the inner sphere as out-of-bounds to civil inter-
vention, agreeing that obligations under natural law apply only to those external
acts that others are entitled to expect of us:
Once one has done [by way of external action] . . . all that one was
required to do, whether the internal act was as vicious as you please,
nobody can ask any more of us, nor, finally, must they do so, even
though the internal principle of the action by which one has acquitted
oneself of what was required had something about it that the divine
tribunal and our own conscience would condemn.38
This concession aside, for Barbeyrac it is not the civil sovereign but the inviolable
rights of the individual conscience that delimit the reach of political authority.
But this is to reinstate the very threat that Pufendorf was seeking to exclude.
For the jurist, we recall, to allow the rule of conscience to preempt the
authority of civil government was to renew the risk of social disruption and reli-
gious war. If individuals believed that their own moral views entitle them to judge
the civil sovereign’s lawful command, they would also believe that subversion
was justified. As to this threat Pufendorf is crystal-clear—to subordinate law to
conscience and political authority to inner insight is to return to social instability:
“[I]f one wishes to ascribe to the practical judgment or conscience some particu-
36.4saunders 6/9/03, 12:08 PM479
480 Eighteenth-Century StudieS      36 / 4
lar power to direct actions, which does not emanate or arise from law, he ascribes
the power of laws to any fantastic idea of men, and introduces the utmost confu-
sion into human affairs.” Therefore, observes Pufendorf, “a place is allowed the
conscience in directing the actions of man, only in respect that it can take cogni-
zance of laws.”39
Is Barbeyrac incoherent in seeking to realign law with conscience while
seeking to avoid enforcement of conscience by the law? If there is incoherence, it
may be less a fault of logic than testimony to the historical circumstances of the
Huguenots, a people with a binding religion but without a political state. What-
ever, in the face of Leibniz’s critique, Barbeyrac’s “defense” of Pufendorf is rather
a matter of serial adjustments that would transform the latter’s natural jurispru-
dence towards a Huguenot perspective.40
The impulses driving this transformation surface in a footnote-essay in
which Barbeyrac takes his distance from Pufendorf’s argument in the De jure that
the political state originates in men’s fear of mutual predation, rather than in their
desire for sociability or need for moral completion. These are issues of fundamen-
tal political conception rather than of simple lexicon, issues whose explication
goes beyond referral to a Huguenot response to circumstance. To throw doubt on
Pufendorf’s singular “original” of the political state, Barbeyrac assembles philo-
sophical and biblical accounts of the origins of sovereignty, with particular em-
phasis on a gradual historical emergence of political rights from agreements, trea-
ties and compacts. Throughout, Barbeyrac speaks not of sovereignty and the state,
but of government and civil society. The political point of this language is made
explicit in one of his multiple references to Locke:
Mr. Locke has, likewise, treated of the Origin of civil societies in his
second Treatise of civil Government, Ch. vii, &c. As for the Rest, all I
have said here in this Note, upon the different Motives which gave Birth
to civil society, does not exclude Conventions either express or tacit.
These must always be supposed to intervene here to found the Authority
of those who command, and the Obligation of those who obey; as well
as to regulate the respective limits of Power and Subjection.41
Barbeyrac thus cites a Lockean account of the governed and their governors reach-
ing mutual agreement over the respective limits of obedience and authority. This
is wholly at odds with Pufendorf’s Hobbesian account of men, driven by mutual
fear, appointing a sovereign who in fulfilling his civil duties is accountable to no
one. Instead, the Lockean rationale of civil authority constrained by natural rights
and consensual agreements was Barbeyrac’s preferred resolution of the otherwise
irresolvable clash of perspectives between Pufendorf’s secularization of the state
in the name of worldly peace and public security, and Leibniz’s counter-propopo-
sition: a resacralization of the state in the name of divine harmony and rational-
moral perfection.42
TWO DISCOURSES ON MORALITY AND THE CIVIL LAWS
Pufendorf composed the De officio as the textbook for students of his
new natural jurisprudence. It was designed to be the instrument that would allow
them to attune themselves—politically and professionally, ethically and personal-
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ly—to the common rules of duty in a post-Westphalian security state. The civil
education of the young was a priority also for Barbeyrac, who included as appen-
dices in the 1718 edition of Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoien two of his own
“academic discourses.” These were formal end-of-year orations, delivered in French
as Rector of the Académie de Lausanne to which he had been appointed in 1710
to teach law and history: a Discours sur la permission des loix in 1715, followed
a year later by a complementary Discours sur le bénéfice des loix.43
Both Discours expound the theme of a higher moral law as the normative
platform from where one’s own conduct and the provisions of the positive (or
civil) laws must be assessed. The Rector left his audience—city officials, the aca-
demic community of teachers and students—in no doubt: strict laws and proce-
dures are necessary but not sufficient. A subject’s mere conformity to the laws is
no guarantee of their goodness as a creature. He had been hired to say this sort of
thing. The rules of law (règles du droit) might serve the civil courts but the pre-
cepts of right (préceptes du droit) serve all humanity before the court of con-
science:
The civil laws and the laws of virtue thus form as it were two distinct
jurisdictions, which may well converge up to a certain point, but
beyond this point virtue alone remains, and commands absolutely. Or
rather virtue is always the supreme mistress.44
Positive laws (loix civiles) might constrain the external acts of men and thus en-
sure civil peace (repos de la société), but they can neither make men virtuous
according to the laws of virtue (loix de la vertu) nor exonerate them from the
duties imposed by God and “the natural empire that virtue holds over men.”45
Though contingent on time and place, the positive laws are not necessarily amiss.
They might, if all is well, accord with the unchanging precepts of right. This
partial concession aside, Barbeyrac’s Discours scarcely constitute a Pufendorfian
eulogy of civil authority in general, or of the civil laws—statute and custom—in
particular.46
Before receiving their prizes, the students were thus forced to confront a
stark discrepancy between positive law and moral principle. In the Discours sur
la permission des loix—now translated as “Discourse on what is permitted by the
laws”—the discrepancy is thematized in Barbeyrac’s subtitle: “Where it is shown
that what is permitted by the laws is not always just and honest.”47 Adopting the
aspirational mode of Christian-Stoic humanism and drawing on his immense trea-
sury of classical and biblical citations, Roman and civil laws, travellers’ tales and
popular errors, the speaker told his audience that legality and public order are not
enough, ever.
There are two lines of argument on actions that are “permitted”—not
forbidden—by the civil laws: one, the permission d’impunité, regarding actions
that can be undertaken with “impunity,” because the civil laws are silent on the
matter; the other, the permission d’approbation, regarding actions that can be
undertaken with “innocence,” because the moral law approves of them. For mor-
al delicts there were penalties: the shame of failing to do all one could do to
develop one’s virtue for the moral good of “society,” and the fear of appearing in
this shameful condition before the heavenly tribunal of God. To persuade them to
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look beyond the mundane order of the civil laws to a moral future accessible
through conscience and reflective moral reason, the students heard instance after
instance where actions permitted by the civil laws contravened a moral law of
nature, “these immutable laws, written in our hearts.”48 Having been reminded
that their youth made them easy prey to passion, the students were given the
predictable advice: even if you can do it legally, don’t!
The Discours sur le bénéfice des loix—now translated as “Discourse on
the benefits conferred by the laws”—demonstrates “that in good conscience one
cannot always take advantage of benefits conferred by the most explicit civil
laws.”49 Barbeyrac again explained to his young listeners why the actions of a
“good man” were, morally speaking, other than those of a merely law-abiding
citizen. Thus “[t]here are laws the benefits of which we can always enjoy without
doing harm to anyone, yet what strict justice then allows, some other virtue in
certain cases forbids.”50 The civil laws cannot do everything, “[b]ut even regard-
ing what lies within the ambit of the civil laws, things cannot always be regulated
in the manner most conforming to the immutable laws of justice that apply to
everything and everywhere.”51 Cicero—not Pufendorf—is cited in support: “The
laws redress injustices in one way, but the philosophers correct them in anoth-
er.”52 The argument and the multifarious examples demonstrate the moral gain in
renouncing benefits conferred by laws that “are themselves most often just, but
they do not embrace all that is just.”53 As a result, “one may act only in accor-
dance with the laws and, notwithstanding this, still fall short in an infinity of
things that true probity demands.”54 It is, in short, a matter of obeying “natural
obligation,” not civil command.
Despite being Pufendorf’s now established French translator, Barbeyrac
makes few references in the two Discours to the author of the De jure and the De
officio. As published, the Permission des loix contains three such references in
margin notes, two of which in fact refer to Barbeyrac’s own notes in the Pufen-
dorf translations. No less space is given to Le Clerc, Bayle, and Noodt. As for the
Bénéfice des loix, there are references to Bodin, Grotius, Noodt, and Thomasius,
but again just three to Pufendorf, one of which is self-referential to a note of
Barbeyrac’s. These bare statistics underscore a feature of the Discours: when speak-
ing in his own voice, the translator makes little call on Pufendorf. If Pufendorf
was the original, Barbeyrac was no transparent copy.
JEAN BARBEYRAC: MEDIATOR OR ADJUSTOR?
Through accumulated views of his writings, especially his Pufendorf trans-
lations and commentaries, Barbeyrac has come to be recognized as a mediator of
opposed positions in early modern conflicts within natural jurisprudence. Histo-
rians of ideas place the great translator in the middle ground between the “volun-
tarism” of a Pufendorf and the “rationalism” of a Leibniz.55 There is no gainsay-
ing the acceptance of such philosophical categorisations. On the textual evidence,
however, it would seem more accurate to characterize Barbeyrac as a serious ad-
justor of Pufendorf’s radical retheorizing of natural law, not its mediator. This
suggestion finds conceptual support in an important discussion of Barbeyrac’s
“anti-Hobbesian mentality,” a mentality that marks the translator’s political and
juridical distance from the author.56
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In the face of the backlash against his Hobbesian reconceptualising of
natural law as a secular ethics distinct from the concerns of moral theology, Pufen-
dorf himself felt the need to adjust the De jure. His detheologizing of natural law
made Pufendorf the favored target of the neoscholastic orthodox—Protestant as
well as Catholic—for whom religion alone could be foundational for political
sovereignty and civil law. Theologians accused him of profanity, impiety, and
even heresy for having set apart what they bound together: natural law and moral
theology, civil authority and clerical religion, state and church. So virulent was
the criticism that in a second edition of the De jure, published in 1684, Pufendorf
masked his civil radicalism by adding an anti-Hobbesian camouflage, though re-
taining almost everything that he had written in the first edition of 1672. The
scholarly authority here is Fiammetta Palladini. Having presented “Pufendorf the
Hobbesian” in the first part of her book, Palladini devotes the second part to
answering the question: “Why did Pufendorf pass for anti-Hobbesian?” Her ex-
planation hinges on reading the changes made by Pufendorf between the two
editions as a ploy to mislead his theologian enemies with false clues as to his being
a regular critic of Hobbes. The changes included an insertion of critical remarks
on Hobbes and extensive references to Richard Cumberland, the English anti-
Hobbes, for whom bene naturale and universal benevolentia were the founda-
tions of natural law doctrine. Palladini does not mute her scholarly outrage: “What
remains is [our] resentment at hearing this talk of a natural goodness, after all the
effort to show that ‘omnes motus et actiones hominis, remota omni lege tam
divina quam humana sint indifferentes.’”57 Or again: “There is more (and worse)
to come” as Pufendorf’s “great theorization of the ineliminable difference be-
tween nature and law” is blurred. The concepts imported into the second edition
of the De jure, Palladini argues, act “like monstrous foreign bodies that attach
themselves to the fabric of a doctrine fashioned, as we have seen, without them
and, in fact, against them.”58
Yet it was just this blurring of Pufendorf’s distinction between nature and
law, religious justification and political duty, that an anti-Hobbesian Barbeyrac
promulgated through his translations. The point, of course, is not to charge Bar-
beyrac with inaccuracy as a translator. Technically speaking, he was not unreflec-
tive on the question of fidelity to originals. In a public oration delivered at Lau-
sanne in 1714, the Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des sciences, he commented
on the status of Latin—the “common tongue of the learned everywhere”—and
the usage of vernaculars:
And no one should think they can exonerate themselves by reading
[vernacular] translations. These have their use: but they suffice only to
encourage readers to strive to acquire that adequate degree of enlighten-
ment [Latinity] to which every good man aspires who has the means to
do so.59
Not only do “Originals always lose much” in translation; they are “as if traves-
tied in the hands of those who dress them in the fashion of their own nation.” As
for translations that have been published,
There are few that are such as to allow one to count on the faithfulness
and the accuracy of the translators, even with regard to histories, where
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everything is sacred, and the least alteration, the least slip, is of fatal
consequence. After all, one is obliged to see with the eyes of another
when one is obliged to have recourse to a translated version.60
This “originalist” posture is struck again with regard to Barbeyrac’s own “faith-
fulness and accuracy” where his translation of Leibniz’s monita is concerned.
Hence the provision in the text of the Jugement of selected citations from the
metaphysician’s Latin. As the translator indicates in a prefatory paragraph: “I
shall attempt to express the anonymous writer’s thoughts with the utmost exacti-
tude; and I shall record in the margin, or in footnotes, the exact terms of his
original, whenever I fear I might not have caught the sense, or for some other
reason.”61
In fact, as argued here, Barbeyrac was an “activist” translator, a political
adjustor of his source . . . when that source was Pufendorf. Appraising a lack in
the latter, Barbeyrac translated Pufendorf out of a secular politics and into a fore-
ordained horizon of individual conscience. This assessment is underscored if his
editing and commentary are included in this work of adjustment. Not for noth-
ing, in the prefatory remarks to his translation of the De jure, does Barbeyrac
advise the reader that he has “rectified the ideas of the author” (although he does
add “and my own”). Nor were the rectifications trivial. The distinction between
“civil society” and “state of nature” is fundamental to Pufendorf’s natural juris-
prudence, marking the new threshold that protects civil institutions against reli-
giously grounded derivations from or metaphysically grounded reductions to “na-
ture.”62 Such protection is the conceptual guarantee of an institutional autonomy
for politics and law.63 For Barbeyrac, however, Pufendorf’s praising of civil soci-
ety, that is, of the political state under the rule of law, and his disparaging of life
in the state of nature, are both excessive. At his most naturalist and anti-institu-
tional, the translator here turns editor with a vengeance. In his French version of
the De officio, he excises from the key opening chapter of Book II Pufendorf’s
unmistakably bleak account of life in the state of nature.64 Later in the same
chapter Barbeyrac repeats this editorial gesture, excising what Pufendorf had
written on man’s existence among the “inconveniences” of the natural state:
For if you form in your Mind the Idea of a Man even at his full Growth
of Strength and Understanding, but without all those Assistances and
Advantages by which the Wit of Man has rendered Human Life much
more orderly and more easie than at the beginning; you shall have
before you, a naked Creature, no better than dumb, wanting all Things,
satisfying his Hunger with Roots and Herbs, slaking his Thirst with any
Water he can find, avoiding the extremities of the Weather by creeping
into Caves or the like, exposed an easie Prey to the ravenous Beasts, and
trembling at the Sight of any of them.65
Instead of commenting, Barbeyrac censors—so important was it to remove an
image that showed existence in the state of nature as an existence to be abrogated.
Excisions that subtract basic elements of Pufendorf’s natural jurispru-
dence are complemented by voluminous footnotes that add Barbeyrac’s serial
adjustments. In his glossing of the De jure, for instance, he intervenes with a
sequence of ten critical footnotes, some of them explicitly anti-Hobbesian.66 The
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final note of the sequence charges Pufendorf with overstating the positive aspects
of the civil state:
Civil Government being a proper Means to restrain the Malice of Men,
the Civil State, without Contradiction, may be more sociable and happy
than the State of Nature; but then we must suppose the Civil Society to
be well governed, otherwise, if a King abuses his Power, or devolves the
Management of civil Affairs to Ministers both ignorant and vicious, as
it often happens, a Civil State is then more unhappy than the State of
Nature; which appears by the Wars, Calamities and Vices which spring
up from such Abuses, and from which the State of Nature would be
free.67
The roseate image that Pufendorf had drawn of existence in the civil state was to
be forfeit. Such critical notes, together with excisions and reorderings of the orig-
inal text and lexical inflections in translation, make up the case: faced with Pufen-
dorf’s political and juridical principles, Barbeyrac was no mere mediator. Nor
was he just a moderate adjustor of Pufendorf. On the evidence of these interven-
tions, there was a more aggressive Barbeyrac. We see a moral philosopher assim-
ilating the political jurist to his own position. We see a resacralized natural juris-
prudence in which the political science of civil duties was rendered once again
continuous with moral theology. To restore this continuity was Barbeyrac’s re-
minder call: there was a moral law of God higher than the civil laws of states.
The effect of Barbeyrac’s adjustments was to blunt the impact of a Pufen-
dorf whose political thought is unequivocally statist. To individuals increasingly
imbued with a Lockean quotient of natural rights and its attendant anti-statism,
such thought was and will remain alien.68 Whereas Barbeyrac now granted con-
science the capacity to determine the limits of legitimate political authority, Pufen-
dorf’s scandalously civil natural jurisprudence had quarantined the civil duties of
the citizen-subject from the religious obligations of the Christian. He had hoped
in this way to keep confessional zeal from once again commandeering political
authority and undermining civil security, as it had done in the years of religious
civil war. The fact is clear: such a radically political jurisprudence as Pufendorf’s
can be adjusted in one direction only, a direction that returns politics to divine
providence, and rejoins law to a religious-metaphysical grounding.
NOTES
1. Barbeyrac’s other major translations include Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis (Le droit de
la guerre et de la paix, 1724) and Richard Cumberland’s De legibus naturae disquisitio philosophica
(Traité philosophique des lois naturelles, 1744).
2. In confessional matters, Pufendorf was a Lutheran, Barbeyrac a Calvinist with Socinian lean-
ings. In his later writings—such as the Jus feciale divinum sive de consensu et dissensu protestant-
ium, posthumously published in 1695—Pufendorf envisaged a Protestant church unified by norms
that, he hoped, would be acceptable both to Lutherans and Calvinists (though he remained close to
mainstream Lutheranism and entirely excluded a predestinarian doctrine of election). As a diasporic
Huguenot, Barbeyrac made the case for toleration of religious minorities in majoritarian confession-
al states. So too did Pufendorf, but on worldly grounds, whether as prudent politics on the part of a
sovereign faced with the all-too-real problem of maintaining civil peace among rival confessions, or
as a justified observance of the legal terms of the Peace of Westphalia.
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3. Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. J. Tully,
trans. M. Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), 8–9. “[N]atural law is confined
within the orbit of this life, and so it forms man on the assumption that he is to lead his life in society
with others. Moral theology, however, forms a Christian man, who, beyond his duty to pass this life
in goodness, has an expectation of reward for piety in the life to come and who therefore has his
citizenship in the heavens while he lives here merely as a pilgrim or stranger.”
4. I. Hunter and D. Saunders, eds., Samuel Pufendorf. The Whole Duty of Man, According to
the Law of Nature. Together with Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianap-
olis: Liberty Fund, 2003). I appreciate Ian Hunter’s comments, helpful as always, on the draft of this
article.
5. The Whole Duty was reissued as the fifth and final edition in 1735.
6. Samuel Pufendorf, Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoien, tels qu’ils lui sont préscrits par la loi
naturelle, trans. J. Barbeyrac (Amsterdam, 1707). In the present article, all references are to the fifth
edition (Amsterdam, 1735). The English editors borrowed 52 of 89 footnotes in Barbeyrac’s 1707
edition. In later editions, as he built his own distinctive position on natural jurisprudence, Barbeyrac
vastly expanded this critical apparatus. Despite requests, Barbeyrac declined to author in his own
name a treatise on natural law, seeming to prefer the role of glossator. See Simone Goyard-Fabre’s
introductory essay in Jean Barbeyrac, Écrits de droit et de morale (Paris: Centre de philosophie du
droit, 1996), 11–12.
7. At the suggestion of Professor Knud Haakonssen, general editor of the Liberty Fund series:
Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics.
8. Leibniz composed his critique at the instigation of Gerhardt van der Muelen, Abbot of Loc-
cum and Director of the Lutheran Consistory in the Electorate of Brunswick, responding to the
cleric’s concern that Pufendorf’s De officio would occasion harm among the young. The letter had
circulated in manuscript, anonymously, since 1701.
9. Since Leibniz had chosen not to identify himself as the letter’s author, Barbeyrac disclosed the
identity for him, albeit posthumously—Leibniz having died shortly before Barbeyrac sent the 1718
edition of Les devoirs to press.
10. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “On the Principles of Pufendorf,” in Leibniz: Political Writings,
ed. and trans. P. Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), 64–75.
11. Alongside the vernacular translations of the De officio further Latin editions appeared, in-
cluding that of the Scottish philosopher, Gerschom Carmichael: De officio hominis et civis juxta
legem naturalem libri duo supplementis et observationibus in academicae juventutis usum auxit et
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13. See Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in
European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 454–73.
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